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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

1880 Utah Laws ch. 20 §6 (Appellee's Addendum 1) in addition to those statutes listed
by HCIC (Appellant's Addendum Tab W).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of Case
This appeal involves a quiet title action as to the prior right to use water from
Cedar Creek, a small stream in Emery County, Utah. Appellees United States Fuel
Company and ANR Co., Inc. and Intervenor Appellee Intermountain Power Agency and
their predecessors in interest (collectively "USF"), have diverted and used water from
Cedar Creek since 1882. The trial court determined that USF's priority date of 1882 is
senior to that of Appellant Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company ("HCIC"). The
trial court further confirmed that since 1882, USF has taken this water upstreamfromthe
point where HCIC on appeal now alleges to have a senior right to divert the same water.
The trial court correctly found that HCIC for generations failed to receive enough water
downstream from USF to satisfy its alleged right to receive the first 10 cubic feet per
second ("cfs") of Cedar Creek. HCIC sat idly by while USF made substantial
investments upstream to divert water for livestock, irrigation of Cedar Creek Ranch
(herein "Ranch"), and for municipal, industrial and coal mining uses in Mohrland and
later in Hiawatha, Utah.
HCIC had numerous opportunities to protest USF's conflicting upstream water use
before the state engineer and to appeal decisions approving USF's upstream water use
projects in 1907, 1930, 1948, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1963, 1968, 1972, 1978 and 1984.
USF's unfettered use of water upstreamfromHCIC since 1882 governs this case and
requires that this Court affirm the trial court's decision. USF's upstream beneficial use
and senior priority defeats HCIC's appeal which relies on alleged paper "firings" and

asserted "priority dates" to claim rights in Cedar Creek which are unsupported by HCIC's
beneficial use of water.
Statement of Relevant Facts
Since 1882, USF and its predecessors have enjoyed peaceful, continuous and open
beneficial use of irrigation water upstreamfromHCIC's alleged point of diversion on
Cedar Creek in Emery County, Utah. (Findingsffif17, 18, 21, 23; R.2739; Exs. 5G, 27B,
27C, 127, 128.) Since 1875 without interference or interruption, USF and its
predecessors used water from Cedar Creek and springs tributary to Cedar Creek to water
livestock upstream from HCIC. (Findingsffl[11, 13, 14, R.2737.) USF's 1882 priority is
also supported by documents of record in Emery County Recorder's Office since 1886.
(Findings 1fl[ 18, 21, R.2739, 2740.) USF and its predecessors used water from Cedar
Creek to irrigate and water livestock on the Ranch and for municipal and industrial uses
in the town of Mohrland and later in Hiawatha, Utah. USF's upstream water use went
unchallenged until 1989 when its use was interrupted for the first time, precipitating this
action. (Findings f 26, R.2742; Exs. 127 and 128.)
In 1889 and 1893, USF's predecessors published and adjudicated their senior use
of Cedar Creek water. In 1889, they filed Desert Land patent applications with the
United States Land Office. Land patent depositions confirm that USF's predecessors in
interest constructed an earthen dam and ditch and diverted for use of the entire flow of
Cedar Creek on the Ranch prior to 1889 upstreamfromHCIC's alleged senior point of
diversion on the same stream. (Ex. 5A-G.) In 1893, the Emery County Water
Commissioners adjudicated USF's water rights in Cedar Creek. The water
commissioners issued a water rights certificate establishing that the first beneficial use of
Cedar Creek on the Ranch began in 1882 and was without protest or challenge by
anyone. (Ex. 5C.)

STATE ENGINEER PROCEEDINGS

In 1907, USF's predecessor published his use of Cedar Creek water when he filed
an application with the state engineer to change existing diversion facilities by
constructing a new dam, enlarging the ditch, and constructing a reservoir—all upstream
from HCIC's alleged point of diversion. (Findings If 17, R.2739.) HCIC's predecessors
failed to protest this application. (Ex. 27A, 27B, 27C.) This was the first of USF's state
engineer filings for use of Cedar Creek water made over many decades to which HCIC
failed to object. (Findingsfflf24, 25, 26, R.2741-42.)
HCIC failed to: (i) protest USF's three applications to appropriate water upstream
published in 1930 and 1957 (Exs. 27A, 30A and 37A) and four upstream change
applications published in 1948, 1957 and 1972 (Exs. 27F, 31 A, 32A and 35A); (ii) seek
judicial review of each of the twelve certificates of appropriation that the state engineer
issued to USF (Exs. 27E, 271, 30D, 3 ID, 32D, 33F, 34C, 35D, 37D, 371 and 38D); or
(iii) protest USF's upstream nonuse extension applications published in 1943 (Ex. J),
1948 (Ex. I), 1953 (Ex. 50H), 1958 (Ex. 50G), 1963 (Ex. 50F), 1968 (Ex. 50E) and 1978
(Ex. C). (Findingsffl[24, 25, 26, R.2741-42.)
On October 11, 1957, USF filed an application to appropriate mine water
developed in the Blackhawk Mine, water determined by the state engineer to be in the
Price River Drainage. (Ex. 37A.) The state engineer published the application in the
Emery County ProgressfromMay 14, 1959 to May 28, 1959. See id. HCIC did not
protest this application. See id. The proof established that the water was used in
Hiawatha for washing coal and coal byproducts, floating of resin, fire protection and
industrial purposes. (Ex. 37B.) On August 4, 1961, the state engineer issued a certificate
confirming that USF had completed its appropriation of the Blackhawk Mine water
within the Price River Drainage. (Ex. 37D.) HCIC did not appeal this certificate.

Beginning in 1972, USF directed the Blackhawk Mine water to the Mohrland
Mine portal through USF's interconnecting underground tunnels and mine workings and
began conveying a portion of the water through a pipeline to the town of Hiawatha. The
Blackhawk Mine water from the Price River Drainage commingled with the Mohrland
Mine water in the San Rafael River drainage. In 1972, USF filed change applications
with the state engineer for the pipeline and changed water use. (R.2785, T.90:5-14,
127:5-128:1, 142:4-12, 147:9-16; R.2787, T.586:5-589:4, 607:4-609:23, 611:3-21, 629:220; R.2788, T.810:7-25, 813:8-19, 816:5-821:21; R.2790, T.1413:12-1414:21, 1431:1518, 1448:10-1449:9; R.2791, T. 1522:12-1523:6, 1545:12-1546:16, 1548:14-1550:5,
1554:2-6, 1564:11-17; Exs. 33B, 33C, 33F, 34B, 34C, 35C, 35D, 37E, 37G, 37H, 371,
38C, 38D, 86, 69A.)
For the first time in nine decades and after nine separate upstream water
development projects by USF, in 1972 HCIC filed protests against three of USF's four
change applications. (Exs. 33E and 37F.) In 1973, the state engineer conducted a
hearing on USF's pipeline change applications. During this hearing, HCIC asserted that
the Blackhawk Mine water was tributary to Cedar Creek, that it had a senior right to that
water, and that its rights would be adversely affected. (Conclusionsffi[15, 16, R.2750;
Exs. 33E and 37F.)
The state engineer held a second hearing in 1983 and another in 1984, but HCIC
failed to appear for either hearing. See id HCIC failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies and appeal to district court not only the state engineer's approvals of USF's
pipeline change applications but also the state engineer's certificates of change. (Exs.
33F, 34C, 35D, 371 and 38D.)

A

NOTICE OF USF'S UPSTREAM WATER USE

HCIC was on notice of USF's upstream water use and development. The
extensive upstream water use, development and investment was set forth in notices
published once a week for four consecutive weeks in the Emery County Progress in 1907
(Ex. 27A), 1933 (Ex. 30A), 1948 (Ex. 31 A), 1953 (Ex. 32A), 1957 (Exs. 27F), and 1972
(Exs. 33A, 34A, 35A, 37A, 38A).
HCIC did not receive sufficient water to satisfy its claim to the first 10.0 cubic feet
per second ("cfs") of Cedar Creek water. (Findings ffl 24, 25, R.2741-42.) HCIC did not
take all of the water that was in Cedar Creek because great portions of the flow were
diverted and used upstream for decades.l Id. The flow of Cedar Creek never exceeded
10.0 cfs2 in the early spring, except during floods, and actually averaged less than 2.0 cfs
into the irrigation season and dwindled to less than 1.0 cfs in late summer. (Findings
% 25, R.2741,2785, T. 144:11-145:4; R.2790, T.1239:4-22.) The flows of Cedar Creek
were diverted upstream and used on the Ranch and the towns of Mohrland and later in
Hiawatha.
USF's INVESTMENT

IN UPSTREAM WATER USE

USF and its predecessors made significant investment in diversion dams, ditches
and reservoirs to use Cedar Creek water upstream from HCIC and its predecessors. (Exs.
27B, 27C, 27D.) Between 1882 and 1972, USF constructed and maintained diversion
1

John Nielson: R.2785, T.85:10-13 (diverted "all" of Cedar Creek), T. 123:8-9 ("I
noticed there wasn't water going down up there at the diversion"), R.2785, T. 125:8-9
("We used all the water there was"); Mike Watson: R.2787, T.695:20-22 ("all the water
was diverted to the Ranch and none diverted out into the original channel"); Larry Pierce:
R.2787, T.579:2-4 ("All" of the water in Cedar Creek was diverted to the Ranch); Robert
Gitlin: R.2789, T.602:24-25 ("All of the water always went to the ranch. We did not
allow any water to go by."); Robert Eccli: R.2788, T.806:l 1-13 ("all o f the water in
Cedar Creek was diverted to the Ranch); Ross Black: R.2787, T.579:2-4 (same).
2
See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-2 (standard unit of measurement of water flow is
discharge of one cubic foot per second time and is known as a second-foot of water).

dams, structures and pipelines to divert, convey and store water for irrigation and
stockwatering on and above the Ranch, municipal and domestic uses in Mohrland and
Hiawatha and industrial uses in Hiawatha. (Findings Iff 24, 25, R.2741-42; Exs. 27G,
27H, 30B, 30C, 3 IB, 31C, 32B, 32C, 33B, 33C, 34B, 35C, 37B, 37C, 37G, 37H, 38C.)
USF invested $83,000 to construct its new pipeline from Mohrland to Hiawatha.
(R.2787, T.721:20-722:22, R.2788, T.816:8-10.) In developing its water pipeline, USF
relied on seven decades of silence by HCIC, and numerous approvals by the State
Engineer authorizing USF's water use investment, including five certificates of
appropriation issued in 1912, 1935, 1957, 1961 and 1962 (Findingsffif24, 25, R.2741-42;
Exs. 27E, 271, 30D, 3 ID, 32D, 35D and 37D).
CONFLICTING DILIGENCE CLAIMS

USF was the upstream water user and had no reason to worry about downstream
diversion of water below USF's point of diversion. No one interfered with USF's
upstream diversions and water use until 1989, and thereafter this litigation was
commenced. (Findings f 26, R.2742; Exs. 127, 128.)
USF filed objections to the San Rafael Proposed Determination listing HCIC as
senior in priority. (Exs. 48B, 48C.) USF objected to the listing of all rights of "junior
appropriators." This reference to junior appropriators encompassed HCIC's alleged
water right because the evidence of first use confirmed that HCIC had a junior priority to
USF's senior right (Findingsfflf19-23, 27, R.2740-42.) USF supplemented its protest,
specifically objecting to HCIC's statement of user claim. (Ex. 48C.)
A flood bridge used by HCIC located two miles downstream from the Ranch at the
intersection of Cedar Creek and the Cleveland Canal was found to exist no earlier than
1929. (Findings \ 20, R.2740; R.2787, T.594:19-595:20.) There was no evidence as to
the date of its construction, and thefloodbridge itself is not evidence that the waters
6

commingled prior to 1903 and, in any event, not prior to March 1,1888 as HCIC alleged.
(Findings f 20, R.2740.)
The trial court found documentary evidence in favor of USF's priority date of
March 1, 1882 more persuasive and reliable than the speculative testimony presented by
HCIC's expert witness as to its asserted priority dates of 1877 and May 1, 1888. The best
and most accurate evidence of a priority date is documentary in nature rather than
conclusions and opinions reached by reading historical accounts and assuming dates of
commingling of waters. The affidavit of John Monsen states a specific date on which
water was beneficially used by USF's predecessor; whereas HCIC can only surmise that
water was beneficially used on the date it asserts. (Findings f 21, R.2740-2741; Ex. 27A,
27B, 27E.)
Even if the waters of Cedar Creek commingled with the waters of Cleveland Canal
on May 1, 1888, there is no evidence that it was placed to beneficial use prior to 1903.
(Findings f 20, 22, R.2740-2741.) Moreover, HCIC failed to establish at trial specifically
which lands, if any, were irrigated with Cedar Creek water prior to 1903. (Findings f 22,
R.2741.) HCIC's primary water rights derive from Huntington Creek, not Cedar Creek,
and are used to irrigate some 32,000 acres of land. (Ex. 55; R.2788, T.881:15-890:16.)
On the other hand, USF uses Cedar Creek as one of its primary sources of water.3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

HCIC, not USF, is barred by estoppel, laches and waiver. Since USF's
predecessor began using Cedar Creek in 1882, there has not been sufficient water from
Cedar Creek to satisfy HCIC's alleged senior claim to the first 10.0 cfs of water
3

HCIC notes that the trial court did not reject its diligence right but held that its
alleged right is junior to USF's diligence right. In effect what this means is that HCIC
would have the right to receive all of the water in Cedar Creek that exceeds 5.246 cfs, the
quantity of water USF has the senior right to receive first. HCIC's appeal inappropriately
seeks to take the first 10.0 cfs and leave the rest, if any, to USF.

downstreamfromUSF's extensive upstream diversion and use of the same water. HCIC
for decades failed to protest USF's upstream appropriation and use of water since 1882.
HCIC stood idly by without protest and allowed USF to make substantial investments in
completing nine (9) projects to divert, convey, appropriate and beneficially use water
upstreamfromHCIC. HCIC repeatedly failed to exhaust its administrative remedies to
challenge USF's upstream use or to appeal for judicial review the state engineer's
numerous approvals of USF's upstream appropriations and use of Cedar Creek water.
HCIC did not appeal any of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that
HCIC is barred from asserting a senior right against USF.
For these same reasons, USF is not barred by the doctrines of estoppel, laches and
waiver. Neither HCIC nor anyone else deprived USF of any water. USF and its
predecessors always have taken their water first before any other water user. For this
reason, USF is not barred by any of the state engineer decisions approving its upstream
water use. Moreover, the 1889 Desert Land Patent Depositions, the 1893 Water
Certificate, and the 1910 John Monsen Affidavit and Proof all support USF's 1882
priority of water use upstreamfromHCIC without any protest or challenge whatsoever.
Neither HCIC's diligence claim nor the San Rafael Proposed Determination bars
USF. USF's extensive, conflicting upstream water use contradicts HCIC's assertions that
USF did not challenge HCIC's alleged seniority. Moreover, USF filed objections to the
proposed determination challenging all junior appropriators listed as senior to USF. This
objection was supplemented to specifically challenge HCIC. HCIC did not appeal the
trial court's findings and conclusions that its rights were junior to USF's. The district
court accepted USF's objections, and no one has ever moved to strike these pleadings.
Further, public policy favors allowing USF's action for monetary damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief to be heard outside of the general water rights
adjudication.
8

Finally, USF has not forfeited any of its water rights partially or otherwise. USF
placed to beneficial all available water from Cedar Creek. There can be no forfeiture
where a water source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy a water right and all
available water is placed to beneficial use. The law of partial forfeiture of water rights
does not apply retroactively in this case. This Court should affirm the trial court's
findings because HCIC failed to marshal all the evidence of irrigated acres on Cedar
Creek. Moreover, the trial court properly admitted Don Barnett's testimony to rebut the
opinion testimony received from HCIC's witness as to the number of acres irrigated on
the Ranch. Further, HCIC failed to prove that USF violated any customary and accepted
irrigation practices in the area for similar soil types. For this reason, this Court should
affirm the trial court's ruling that USF did not forfeit any water rights by waste.
ARGUMENT
I.

HCIC--NOT USF--IS BARRED BY ESTOPPEL, LACHES, AND WAIVER
The Court should reject HCIC's theory and arguments on appeal because

analytically and physically, they do not run upstream. HCIC ignores that its alleged
diversion was located downstream from USF's upstream diversion and extensive use of
water. Further, since USF's predecessor began using Cedar Creek in 1882, there has not
been sufficient water to satisfy HCIC's alleged senior claim to the first 10.0 cfs of water
downstreamfromUSF. HCIC has: (i) failed to protest USF's upstream appropriation
and use of Cedar Creek since 1882; (ii) stood idly by without protest and allowed USF to
make substantial investments in completing nine (9) projects to divert, convey,
appropriate and beneficially use Cedar Creek upstream from HCIC, (iii) repeatedly failed
to exhaust its administrative remedies to challenge USF's upstream use; and
(iv) repeatedly failed to appeal for judicial review the state engineer's numerous
approvals of USF's upstream appropriations and use of Cedar Creek.

HCIC did not appeal the trial court's conclusions of law and findings of fact that
HCIC is barred from asserting a senior right against USF. (Findings f 24, R.2741;
Conclusions f 9, R.2749.) Instead HCIC appealed the trial court's conclusion of law that
USF is not barred. (Conclusions 1J19, R.2751.) If the Court were to rule in HCIC's
favor, it would lead to the absurd result that both USF and HCIC are barredfromusing
Cedar Creek. The Court should affirm the trial court's ruling because HCIC did not
challenge the trial court's conclusions and findings that HCIC is barred.
The trial court correctly found that HCIC was receiving less than its alleged right
to receive the first 10.0 cfs of Cedar Creek water. (Findings ^ 25, R.2741.) HCIC did not
challenge this finding and sidestepped its effect in its opening brief. HCIC simply has
not diligently guarded its purported senior claim to the supply of water in this case. The
trial court applied the water law principle established by this Court that if HCIC, located
downstream,
did not receive sufficient water to satisfy its right, then it
cannot sit idly by without protest and allow [USF] to
appropriate water and place it to beneficial use and construct
improvements and operate in reliance on that water.
College In. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork In. Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1244
(Utah 1989); Conclusions f 9, R.2749. HCIC ignores not only this case but the
significant body of precedent in support of USF's position.
This Court has repeatedly determined that a senior water right claimant must
jealously guard their rights and protest any attempt by another to make improvements
allowing conflicting water use. In Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 98 P.2d 695, 702
(Utah 1940), a protestant failed to challenge an application to appropriate water filed in
1911. The applicant "expended large sums for pumps and diversion works and
contracted with farmer[s] ... to sell them water." Id. at 701. In 1924, the state engineer
issued applicant's certificate of appropriation. The protestant finally filed a protest in
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1926, but it was held to be too late because the protestant was barred from asserting his
claim to the detriment of others. The protestant's silence misled applicant into believing
there were no senior rights to threaten the applicant's substantial investment in his water
use project. See id. at 701-02. The applicant relied on the protestant's silence and
inaction by making substantial investments in placing water to use. The Court noted that
the protestant could have objected at any time during the administrative process. See id.
at701.4
In addition, water users must exercise their statutory rights, folly participate in
state engineer proceedings, and appeal to district court any adverse state engineer ruling.
See S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) (holding where a water user
had not participated in the proceedings before the state engineer, the water user waived
its right to judicial review).
Two other decisions of this Court established that water users must timely appeal
any adverse decision of the state engineer; they cannot postpone and delay asserting their
claims in a later lawsuit. In GlenwoodIrrigation Co. v. Myers, 465 P.2d 1013, 1015
(Utah 1970) (barring protestant's lawsuit claiming water rights were forfeited because
action was filed three years after state engineer granted nonuse extension and protestant
"did not avail itself of the statutory review and sat idly by while defendant... materially
altered his position"); Provo City v. Lambert, 545 P.2d 185, 186-87 (Utah 1976) (water
4

See also Orient Mining Co. v. Freckleton, 74 P. 652, 653-4 (Utah 1903) (water
user is estopped from claiming senior water right after standing by and watching another
water user make valuable improvements to place water to use and failing to inform the
competing user of superior water right); Brixen & Christopher Architects v. Elton, 111
P.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (parties are barred from asserting rights where
their silence and inaction render it inequitable to allow them to assert those rights); Clark
v. Kirby, 55 P. 372, 374 (Utah 1898) ('"he who is silent when conscience requires him to
speak shall be debarred from speaking when conscience requires him to keep silent.'")
(citation omitted); Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976)
(estoppel applies when a party is silent "when he ought to speak.").

user's complaint seeking to modify water rights certificate of appropriation was filed 23
years too late—appeal should have been within 60 days of state engineer's decision).
A.

HCIC IS BARRED

HCIC cannot make the doctrines of estoppel, laches or waiver run upstream.
HCIC adopts USF's theories, turns them on their head, and attempts to change USF's
long history of upstream water use that conflicted with and directly challenged HCIC's
alleged rights downstream. HCIC, not USF, is barred because: (i) USF was diverting
water upstreamfromHCIC's alleged point of diversion - a direct challenge to HCIC's
alleged senior right, and (ii) HCIC was not receiving enough water to satisfy its asserted
right to the first 10.0 cfs from Cedar Creek. (Findings 1f1f 24, 25, R2741; Conclusions
ffif 9, 16, R.2749-50.) HCIC does not challenge these findings or conclusions. Moreover,
the trial court's findings directly contradict HCIC's claim that USF "leapfrogged" its
priority or did not challenge HCIC's claim to a senior right. (Findingsffl[26, 27,
R.2742.)
HCIC fixates on "filings" and "priority" but completely ignores upstream
beneficial use by USF which is the "basis, the measure, and the limit of all rights to the
use of water in this state." Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3. USF, not HCIC, acted for decades
as the first priority user — "first in time is first in right." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork
Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, If 34, 5 P.3d 1206 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1). There is
no evidence that HCIC diverted the water in a manner that prevented USF from diverting
it first. In fact, it was physically impossible for HCIC to divert Cedar Creek prior to
USF's upstream diversions. There is no evidence that HCIC or anyone else deprived
USF of any water until 1989 and only then for a short period of time, which action
precipitated this litigation. (Findingsffll24, 25, 26, R.2741-42; Conclusions f 9, 16,
R.2749-50.)
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HCIC cannot now assert against USF a senior right — it is too late. HCICs
silence has cast USF into the precarious position of having to reprove over a century of
upstream diversions and water use. Evidence has been lost. People with personal
knowledge have died. The unfairness of HCIC's silence is manifest in USF's having to
now prove the priority of its water rights at this late date when HCIC had every reason to
file timely protests against USF's conflicting upstream water use. To protect its alleged
rights, HCIC was required to participate in each of the state engineer's many proceedings
authorizing USF's upstream water use, exhaust its administrative remedies and appeal to
district court each state engineer approval of USF's upstream water projects.
1.

HCIC Repeatedly Failed to Exercise Its Statutory Duty

HCIC repeatedly failured to exercise its statutory duty, not just a failure to protest
a single application to appropriate as in Tanner, to appeal a single extension application
as in Glenwood, timely appeal a single certificate to appropriate as in Provo City, protest
a single water use project as in Orient, or participate in state engineer proceedings
involving a single change application as in S&G. HCIC blatantly disregarded its
obligations to challenge USF's upstream water use that deprived HCIC of water that was
necessary to satisfy its claim to the first 10.0 cfs on Cedar Creek. HCICs inaction began
as of USF's priority date in 1882 and continued until 1989 when HCIC interfered with
this use. (Findings If 26, R.2750.)
As in Tanner, HCIC failed to protest USF's three applications to appropriate water
upstream in 1907, 1930 and 1957 and four upstream change applications in 1948, 1957
and 1972. See 1905 Utah Laws ch. 108, § 38, at 157 (granting right to protest); 1919
Utah Laws ch. 67, § 47, at 191 (same); Utah Code Ann. § 100-3-7 (1943) (same); Utah
Code Ann. § 73-3-7 (1953) (same); 1959 Utah Laws ch. 137, § 1, at 319 (same).

Moreover, HCIC failed to protest USF's upstream nonuse extension applications
in 1943, 1948, 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968 and 1978, respectively. See Utah Code Ann. §
100-3-13 (1943) (granting right to protest); 1947 Utah Laws ch. 142, § 1, at 449 (same);
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-13 (1953) (same). Under Tanner, S & G, and Glenwood, HCIC
is now barredfromprotesting any water use under these applications.
As in S & G, HCIC failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in the state
engineer's proceedings after filing protests in 1972 against three of USF's four pipeline
change applications and two nonuse extension applications. See S &G, 797 P.2d at
1087. After waiting nearly a century until 1972 to file its first protest, HCIC attended
two hearings in 1973 but failed to participate in the 1983 and 1984 hearings, exhaust its
administrative remedies and appeal to district court the state engineer's approval of the
pipeline change applications and issuance of certificates of change. (Findings tlf 24, 25,
R.2741; Conclusions 1fij 9, 16, R.2749-50.) HCIC is now barred from challenging USF's
water use under these pipeline change applications and nonuse extension applications.
As in Glenwood and Provo City, HCIC failed to seek judicial review of the state
engineer's: (i) approval of the four pipeline change applications; (ii) issuance of twelve
certificates of appropriation to USF; and (iii) grant of nine nonuse extensions. See 1905
Utah Laws ch. 108, § 43, at 158 (imposing deadline for appealing to district court state
engineer's decisions); 1919 Utah Laws ch. 67, § 54, at 193 (same); Utah Code Ann.
§ 100-3-14 (1943) (same); Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 (1953) (same).
HCIC is barred from challenging USF's conflicting upstream water use approved
by the state engineer. Moreover, under East Bench and Glenwood, the trial court cannot
consider any issue that HCIC could have earlier raised on appeal to district court. East
Bench Irr. Co, v. Utah, 300 P.2d 603 (Utah 1956). Those issues include forfeiture by
USF, interference with any vested right of HCIC, the priority between the competing
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rights of USF and HCIC, and whether the Blackhawk Mine water is tributary to Cedar
Creek.
2.

USF Relied on HCIC'S Silence

HCIC's generations of silence in the face of significant investment by USF and its
predecessors in nine separate upstream water use projects dwarf the facts in Tanner,
Glenwood, and Orient. HCIC sat idly by without protest allowing USF and its
predecessors to make substantial investment in the use of water from Cedar Creek and the
Mohrland Portal USF and its predecessors relied on that silence and inaction in making
significant investment in diversion dams, ditches and reservoirs to use virtually the entire
flow of Cedar Creek for irrigating the Ranch and watering livestock. USF made further
investments in constructing and maintaining pipelines to divert and transfer water for
irrigation and stock watering on the Ranch, municipal, industrial and domestic uses in
Mohrland and Hiawatha. (Findings ff 24, 25, R.2741.)
USF invested $83,000 to construct a new pipeline from Mohrland to Hiawatha.
USF relied on seven decades of silence by HCIC and numerous approvals by the state
engineer authorizing USF's water use investment, including five certificates of
appropriation issued in 1912, 1935, 1957, 1961 and 1962. Relying on HCIC's silence
and inaction, USF for decades placed water to beneficial use for irrigating and
stockwatering on the Ranch and conveyed water for nearly two decades through the
pipeline for industrial uses and numerous municipal and domestic uses in Hiawatha.
Moreover, USF made substantial investment in maintaining the pipeline from 1972 to the
filing of this lawsuit. In addition, after filing a protest in 1983, HCIC failed to appeal the
state engineer's decision approving Extension Application 508 that granted USF an
additional five years until 1988 to resume use of water formerly used in Mohrland for
municipal and domestic uses. (Findings f|j 32, 34, R.2744; Ex. 50B.) USF relied on

HCICs silence and made a substantial investment to complete its diversion to Hiawatha
through the Mohrland pipeline. (Ex. 50A.)
3.

HCIC was on Notice of the Extensive Upstream Diversion.
Development and Use of Water

HCIC was on notice of USF's investment in upstream water development projects
which were advertised once a week for four consecutive weeks in the Emery County
Progress in 1907 (Ex. 27A), 1933 (Ex. 30A), 1948 (Ex. 31 A), 1953 (Ex. 32A), 1957
(Exs. 27F), and 1972 (Exs. 33A, 34A, 35A, 37A, 38A). HCIC remained silent and took
no action to prevent USF's water use until 1989. (Findings ff 24, 25, 26, R.2741-42;
Exs. 127 and 128.)
HCIC was on notice of the upstream diversions, water use and significant
investment in reliance on HCIC inaction and silence.5 HCIC alleges a right to
continuously divert the first 10.0 cfs from Cedar Creek before any other water user,
including USF. There is no doubt that USF's Cedar Creek diversions above the Ranch
and the town of Mohrland and at the Mohrland Portal removed water that would have
flowed downstream to HCIC. Because these diversions left significantly less than 10.0
cfs in Cedar Creek, HCIC had every reason to protest USF's upstream water use
consistent with College Irrigation, 780 P.2d at 1244. (Conclusions % 9, R.2749.)6

Since 1886 HCIC has been on constructive notice. March 31, 1886 was the date
of first recording of a transfer of Cedar Creek water to USF's predecessors in interest.
(Exs. 6, 7.) Recording of this instrument with the Emery County Recorder "imparts
notice to all persons of the contents thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (1989).
6
HCIC has argued that it has a "high flow" water right up to 10 cfs. In essence all
this really means is that, assuming HCIC has a valid diligence right, it is barred from
preventing USFfromtaking the first 5.246 cfs from Cedar Creek but retains the right to
divert the remainder of Cedar Creek up to 10 cfs.
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B.

HCIC--NOT USF--IS BARRED BY THE 1984 STATE ENGINEER
DECISIONS

HCIC asserts that USF did not rely on the 1984 state engineer decisions when it
built its pipeline to Hiawatha in 1972. Moreover, HCIC argues that it did not have an
obligation to appeal because the state engineer's decisions were subject to and prohibited
interference with HCIC's claim to senior rights. However, when viewed in the context of
all the record, physical evidence and circumstances, it was reasonable for USF to have
completed the pipeline to Hiawatha based on decades of downstream silence both before
and after HCIC's single protest in 1972. USF had every reason to believe that it had the
senior right to divert all of the Cedar Creek and Blackhawk Mine water. Hence, USF
could complete the pipeline to continue using that water. Moreover, the state engineer
ratified USF's pipeline and water transfer to Hiawatha when he issued his decisions
approving the pipeline change applications. Consistent with its prior inactivity, HCIC
never appealed this approval to district court—even though it was legally obligated to do
so.
Curiously, HCIC did not assert a prior right to Cedar Creek water in its 1972
protest. The protest merely stated that HCIC "holds rights in this area and believes that
these changes may interfere with these rights." (Ex. 33D.) Even more curious is HCIC's
protest against USF's Extension Application in 1983 where HCIC merely asserted that it
"can and has been using this water to better advantage, that United States Fuel Company
has had sufficient time to resume use, and that it is not reasonable for them to resume
use." (Ex. 50B.) Further, HCIC requested "forms to apply for this water to be used in
the Cleveland Canal During[sic] this time period." Id. This request suggests that HCIC
had not yet appropriated a water right and believed that it needed to apply to the state
engineer to receive Cedar Creek water already appropriated by USF.

Further, HCIC's mere allegations in a state engineer proceeding of a senior right
did not establish its claim. HCIC wrongly presupposes that the state engineer's
designation of a priority date or administrative recognition of senior rights determines
priority. This Court has unequivocally established that the "determination of the priority
of rights is a judicial function and not among the powers of the state engineer."
Whitmore v. Murray City, 154 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1944). Hence, none of the state
engineer's priority dates or designations of any senior rights bar USF by estoppel, laches
or waiver, as HCIC asserts. USF's upstream beneficial use in this case defeats HCIC's
priority assertion. Moreover, because HCIC never received sufficient water downstream
to satisfy its alleged senior right, it was required to appeal the 1984 decisions to challenge
the conflicting upstream use of water. (Conclusions f 9, R.2749.)
In constructing the pipeline, USF relied on seventy years of silence by HCIC,
numerous approvals by the state engineer authorizing USF's water use investment,
including the five Certificates of Appropriation issued in 1912, 1935, 1957,1961 and
1962. Relying on HCIC's downstream silence and inaction, USF for decades placed
upstream water to beneficial use for irrigating the Ranch and watering livestock and
conveyed water during nearly two decades through the pipeline for extensive industrial,
municipal and domestic uses in Hiawatha. Moreover, USF made substantial investment
in maintaining the pipeline and storing and placing the water to beneficial use from 1972
to the filing of this lawsuit. HCIC was silent downstream during this entire period until
1989 when it briefly interfered with USF's upstream diversions. (Findings f 26, R.2742.)
C.

USF IS NOT BARRED BY 1984 STATE ENGINEER DECISIONS

HCIC incorrectly asserts that USF is barred by not appealing the state engineer's
1984 decisions that approved USF's pipeline change applications. The state engineer
approved the piping of the Blackhawk Mine waterfromthe Mohrland Portal for use in

Hiawatha and the piping of water from Cedar Creek, formerly used in Mohrland, for use
in Hiawatha. (Exs. 33E and 33F.)
USF had no reason to appeal either of the 1984 state engineer memorandum
decisions. USF had no reason to assert its prior diligence right which had never been
protested or challenged up to that point in time. Further, USF put the water to use in
Hiawatha for two decades—this is not "doing nothing at all" as HCIC asserts. Moreover,
USF was allowed by the state engineer to convey by pipeline all of the Blackhawk Mine
water together with all of the water that it had previously used in the town of Mohrland.7
Therefore, USF was not deprived of any water or water use as a result of the state
engineer's decisions and cannot be barred by estoppel. (Conclusions % 9, R.2749.)
D.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE THAT
BLACKHAWK MINE WATER WAS TRIBUTARY TO CEDAR
CREEK

The trial court correctly excluded all evidence relating to whether the Blackhawk
Mine water is tributary to Cedar Creek. (Findings % 8, R.2736.) The several water law
decisions decided by this Court and discussed above establish that a protestant must
appeal the state engineer's decision for de novo review in district court where all issues
related thereto can be fully and completely litigated. Further, in East Bench, this Court
held that "there are issues in every appealfromthe [state engineer's] decision which
must be adjudicated." 300 P.2d at 607 (emphasis added). Those issues include
"impairment of vested rights" of others and "priority of conflicting rights." Id. As in
Glenwood, HCIC "is now estopped to assert" whether Blackhawk water is tributary to
Cedar Creek because HCIC did not "avail itself of the statutory review and sat idly by"
while USF "materially altered its position." 465 P.2d at 1015.
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USF is not claiming a right to any more water than was approved for piping under
Exhibit 33E.

At this late date, HCIC is barredfromlitigating whether the Blackhawk Mine
water is tributary to Cedar Creek. As in Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 98 P.2d 695, 702
(Utah 1940), HCIC failed to protest USF's 1957 application to appropriate the
Blackhawk Mine water. As in S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085,1087 (Utah 1990),
HCIC did not participate in the proceedings. As in Provo City v. Lambert, 545 P.2d 185,
186-87 (Utah 1976) and Glenwood Irrigation Company v. Myers, 465 P.2d 1013, 1015
(Utah 1970), HCIC did not file an appeal of the state engineer's approval of the
application.
As in Tanner, Lambert, and Glenwood, USF relied on HCIC's silence in
completing valuable improvements to divert the mine water from the Blackhawk portal
located in the Price River drainage. HCIC filed a protest against USF's pipeline change
applications and raised the tributary issue in the state engineer's proceedings. (Ex. 37F.)
HCIC participated in the 1973 hearing but not in the 1983 and 1984 hearings. (Findings
f 16, R.2750.) After the state engineer sent HCIC a copy of his decision approving the
pipeline change applications, as in Lambert and Glenwood, HCIC failed to appeal.8 USF
has spent significant sums constructing, repairing and maintaining its pipeline to convey
the Blackhawk Mine water back to the Price River Drainage. Moreover, downstream
water users in the Price River Drainage have relied on the Blackhawk Mine water for
many years since at least 1957. The trial court's ruling quieting USF's title to the
Blackhawk rights should stand. (Conclusions f 8, R.2748.)

In addition, the state engineer recognized and included USF's rights to the
Blackhawk Mine water and its diversionfromthe Mohrland portal in the Proposed
Determination of Water Rights in the Price River Drainage, (Area Code No. 91), Book 4,
Page 987. HCIC never filed an objection against this proposed determination by the state
engineer and is forever barred from doing so. See, e.g., In re Escalante Valley Drainage
Area, 12 Utah 2d 112, 113, 363 P.2d 777, 778 (1961) (water users are barred by failing to
object to proposed determination); Green River Adjudication v. United States, 17 Utah 2d
50, 52,404 P.2d 251, 252 (1965) (same).
OA

E.

HCIC--NOT USF--IS BARRED BY 1889 DESERT LAND PATENT
DEPOSITIONS, 1893 WATER CERTIFICATE, AND 1910 MONSEN
AFFIDAVIT & PROOF

HCIC has misconstrued and misapplied the 1889 Desert Land Patent depositions,
1893 Water Certificate, and 1910 John Monsen Affidavit. These three documents
support the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that HCIC, not USF, is
barred by estoppel, laches, and waiver. (Findingsffif17, 18, 24,25, R.2739-41;
Conclusions % 9, R.2749.) This Court must give the trial court's findings deference
because HCIC has not challenged any of the trial court's findings by marshaling
evidence.9 Further, these documents all pertain to the same diligence right that was
appropriated by predecessors of USF in placing surface water to beneficial use prior to
March 12, 1903, the date the Utah Legislature adopted the appropriation system and
grandfathered prior diligence rights to surface waters. See 1903 Utah Laws ch. 100,
§ 47;10 Eskelsen, 819 P.2d at 771. Moreover, the documents establish that since 1882,
USF's beneficial water use occurred upstream from HCIC's alleged points of diversion
9

HCIC has the duty to "marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite the evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support
as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence.'" In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885,
885 (Utah 1989).
10
Under Utah law, a diligence right may be established by showing beneficial
surface water use prior to 1903 by a user's predecessors in interest. In Eskelsen v. Town
ofPerry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991), the trial court relied on records of the Box Elder
County Recorder's office and affidavits to establish pre-1903 water use. Id. at 774. The
Eskelsen trial court also relied on affidavits from people who stated that they were
"informed" and were "told" of water use predating 1903. Id. Documents in the present
case go beyond the requirements of Eskelsen and provide direct and specific evidence of
extensive pre-1903 upstream water use. USF's evidence is more consistent with higher
evidentiary standards to establish pre-1903 beneficial water use required by this Court in
earlier cases. Finding ^f 21; see Richfield Cottonwood Irr. Co. v. City ofRichfield, 34
P.2d 945, 949 (Utah 1934); Aft. Olivet Cemetery Ass fn v. Salt Lake City, 235 P. 876, 878
(Utah 1925). In addition, HCIC's' expert witness and Regional State Engineer, Mark
Page, correctly observed during his testimony that there is no time limit placed on filing
a diligence claim (R.2789, T. 1000:6-8), except for Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-9 (1989),
which USF satisfied.

and deprived the downstream user of water to satisfy its alleged senior claim to the first
10.0 cfs from Cedar Creek.
1-

HCIC is Barred bv the 1889 Land Patent Depositions

HOC, not USF, is barred by the 1889 Desert Land patent depositions. The
depositions were submitted in 1889 by USF's predecessors to the United States Land
Office to support their Desert Land patents. The depositions confirm that USF's
predecessors in interest constructed an earthen dam and ditch and diverted and used the
entire flow of Cedar Creek on the Ranch, prior to 1889 and upstream from HCIC's
alleged point of diversion on the same stream. (Ex. 5A-G.) Thus, the depositions are
evidence that HCIC was being deprived of water upstream from its alleged senior
diversion.
Moreover, the depositions confirm that the Ranch irrigation ditch was constructed
sometime prior to 1889.11 These depositions do not establish that this water use was the
first irrigation on the Ranch. Rather, they confirm that the water rights had been
appropriated by USF's predecessors prior to the execution of the depositions, the whole
community acquiesced in the upstream water appropriation, and there were no adverse
claims to the water rights.12 Notice of this upstream activity was published for four
weeks in the Castle Valley News further evidencing that HCIC had at least constructive
notice of the upstream water diversion, development and use. (Ex. 5D.) Finally, the
deposition testimony is limited to supporting a patent for only an 80-acre parcel of the
11

A diagram accompanying the proof of John A. Trimble shows a dam on Cedar
Creek diverting water into a main ditch on the Ranch, the main ditch was dammed, and a
side ditch was constructed to deliver Cedar Creek water to the 80 acre parcel. (Ex. 5B.)
12
See Ex. 5D, R.Gordon Dep., f 5 , at 1 ("Claimant acquired and maintained his
water right by prior appropriation and his right is undisputed and acquiesced in by the
whole community. There is no adverse claim for either the land or the water.")
(emphasis added); Ex. 5D, R. Scott Dep., % 5, at 1 (same); Ex. 5D, J. Trimble Dep. f 6
(same).

Ranch, a small portion of the lands comprising the Ranch.13 The trial court found that
135.66 acres on the Ranch were irrigated and 229.3 acres were prepared for irrigation.
(Findings H 30, R.2743.)
2.

HCIC is Barred by the 1893 Water Certificate

HCIC, not USF, is barred by the 1893 water certificate. In 1893, the Water
Commissioners of Emery County, Utah Territory, issued to John Trimble, USF's
predecessor, a Certificate of Water Right adjudicating the Ranch diligence right under the
Water Act of 1880, as amended. (Ex. 5C at 4; Ex. 14.) The water commissioners issued
the water certificate upon "evidence furnished by an abstract of said water right" and
"records on file with the Emery County Recorder's Office." The title abstract confirmed
that "prior rights to pre-1889 irrigation on the Ranch dates back to 1886." (Ex. 5B at 1319.)
The water certificate supports USF's 1882 priority date and water use and
development taking place upstream from HCIC's alleged senior point of diversion
without any protest or challenge whatsoever. The 1880 Act, as amended, recognized preexisting diligence rights as having "vested and accrued" whenever an appropriator had
the "open, peaceable, uninterrupted and continuous use of water for a period of 7 years."
1880 Utah Laws ch. 20, § 6, at 37. The water commissioners concluded that the water
from Cedar Creek was "openly and continuously" used by John A. Trimble and his heirs
for "domestic purposes and for irrigation . . . for about four years last past." (Ex. 5C at 23.) Therefore, the 1883 certificate actually established first beneficial water use in 1882
— eleven years earlier than the date of the certificate (i.e., 1893 minus 4 years minus 7

See Deposition of Witnesses, Robert Gordon,fflf6, 7 and 9; Deposition of
Witnesses, John H. Scott, ffl 6, 7 and 9; Deposition of Applicant, John Trimble, % 9 and
11; Ex. 5B.

years equals 1882). See Robert W. Swenson, A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part /, 5 J.
Energy L. & Pol'y 165, 170-3 (1984).14
HCIC was on notice of the upstream appropriation by USF's predecessors and did
nothing to protest the conflicting upstream use. The certificate is credible and convincing
evidence that USF has the senior right on Cedar Creek. The water certificate was
recorded in the official records of Emery County on January 30, 1893, in Book B, Page
172. (Ex. 14.) Under § 4 of the 1880 Act, a certificate of water right "shall be deemed to
impart notice to all persons whomsoever of the contents thereof, and shall be prima facie
evidence of the existence and verity of facts therein recited." 1880 Utah Laws ch. 20,
§ 4, at 37 (emphasis added). This Court has determined that a certificate of water right is
evidence of a pre-1903 diligence right. See Bigler v. Fryer, 25 P.2d 598 (Utah 1933);
Holman v. Christensen, 274 P. 457,460-61 (Utah 1929).
3.

HCIC is Barred by the 1910 Monsen Affidavit and Proof

HCIC, not USF, is barred by the John Monsen Affidavit.15 In 1907, USF's
predecessor in interest filed with the state engineer Application A1408 to improve the
original ditch diverting Cedar Creek water for use on the Ranch and to construct a
reservoir to store water at night to create a larger stream for irrigation during the day.
(Findings f 17, R.2739; Ex. 27A.) Contrary to HCIC's argument, Water Right No. 93904 was not appropriating a new water right. Rather, the application was filed to change
existing diversion facilities by constructing a new dam, enlarging the ditch and
constructing a reservoir-again upstream from and without any protest by HCIC's
predecessors in interest. (Exs. 5G, 27B, 27C.)

However, even if, as argued by HCIC, the water right vested in 1889, rather than
1882, the certificate relates to only an 80 acre portion of and not to the entire Ranch.
15
Affidavits are admissible to establish beneficial use of surface water prior to 1903.
See Eskelsen 819 P.2d at 774.
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The Monsen Affidavit and proof map confirm March 1, 1882, as the first date that
water was diverted and placed to beneficial use for irrigation on the Ranch. (Findings
% 17, R.2739.) Monsen's affidavit confirms that on April 15, 1881, construction of the
diverting ditch from Cedar Creek to the Ranch was commenced. (Exs. 5G, 27B, 27C.)
The affidavit states that on March 1, 1882, water from Cedar Creek was diverted and
placed to beneficial use on the Ranch. Id. The proof map shows that the old dam and
canal on Cedar Creek were replaced in 1910 by diversion works under Application
A1408 (93-904). (Ex. 27D.)
Contrary to HCIC's assertions, John Monsen verified in his Affidavit that he had
first-hand knowledge of the Ranch and first beneficial water use. The trial court properly
found that HCIC has no comparable evidence to refute the sworn Monsen Affidavit and
accompanying verified proof map. (Findingsffif16-23, R.2739-2741.) The proof also
establishes that the original dam was diverting the entire flow of Cedar Creek, including
flood waters, to irrigate 149.93 acres on the Ranch.
Monsen's affidavit is independent evidence of first beneficial use regardless of the
date the state engineer assigned to Certificate 107B for Water Right 93-904.16 Utah law
required the state engineer to assign a priority date to the application based on the date of
filing of the application. See 1905 Utah Laws, ch. 108, § 46 at 159. Accordingly, the
On December 11, 1912, State Engineer Caleb Tanner issued to USF's predecessor
in interest Certificate 107B covering the use of water under Application A1408 upstream
from HCIC. (Ex. 27D.) The state engineer confirmed that all the flow of Cedar Creek
was diverted, stored and beneficially used to irrigate 149.93 acres on the Ranch. (Id.)
Certificate 107B is prima facie evidence of beneficial use of water by USF's predecessors
in interest. See Little v. Greene & Weedlnv., 839 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1992); Utah Code
Ann. § 73-3-17 (1955) (certificate of appropriation is "prima facie evidence of the
owner's right to the use of water in the quantity, for the purpose and place and during the
times specified therein, subject to prior rights."); Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View
Duck Club, 166 P. 309, 311 (Utah 1917) (certificate of appropriation is user's "evidence
of title, good at least against the state . . . and . . . against everyone else who cannot show
a superior right.")

state engineer had to assign a priority date based on the date of filing, June 4, 1907,
instead of March 1, 1882, the date water was first beneficially used as a diligence right
Contrary to HCIC's argument, the June 4, 1907 date does not bar USF from
asserting its 1882 diligence right. USF had no reason to challenge the 1907 date the state
engineer assigned to Certificate 107B. No one protested the 1907 application. For
decades USF's diversion and water use was the uppermost on Cedar Creek. USF and its
predecessors were able to use the water at their pleasure, unmolested and without any
interference until 1989. (Findings % 26, R.2742.) USF was completely justified in using
water upstream without protest and allowing HCIC, or any other downstream user, to try
to appropriate whatever water remained after USF had placed the water to beneficial use.
USF had no reason to protest or even care about HCIC's or any other downstream user's
use of the return flow of water.17 For these reasons, USF had no reason to establish its
1882 diligence right until its water use was challenged for the first time in 1989.
By contrast, HCIC was on notice of USF's upstream water use that began in 1882
and continued thereafter without challenge until 1989. USF did not wait until 1992 to
assert an earlier priority date as HCIC contends. USF did not suddenly reverse a century
of acquiescence. Rather, the 1889 land patent depositions, 1893 water certificate and
1910 Monsen affidavit and proof all establish that since 1882 USF and its predecessors'
upstream use directly challenged the alleged senior claim of HCIC. HCIC and its
predecessors knew or should have known of the competing upstream water use. USF's
upstream use was depriving HCIC and its predecessors of water that would have satisfied
its asserted senior claim to the first 10.0 cfs of Cedar Creek. Instead of challenging the
upstream use and asserting its alleged senior claim, HCIC sat idle for decades allowing
Regional State Engineer Mark Page testified that flood irrigation as used on the
Ranch is "around 50 percent efficient." (R.2789, T.993:18-20.) The other 50 percent not
consumed by plants "returns to the system" for downstream use. (R.2789, T.993:24-25.)
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USF to rely upon the water and make substantial investments in water development and
use.
F.

HCIC'S DILIGENCE CLAIM DOES NOT BAR USF

HCIC's 1970 diligence claim does not bar USF by estoppel, laches or waiver.
(Findings f 26, R.2742.) HCIC incorrectly asserts that the filing of its diligence claim
and statement of water user's claim notified USF of HCIC's alleged downstream senior
water right. HCIC's expert witness and Regional State Engineer, Mark Page, explained
that a "diligence claim is simplyfiledwith the [state engineer's] office as part of our
record, it is prima facie evidence but has not been scrutinized by the public or other water
users." (R.2789, T. 1002:8-12.) Further, Mr. Page testified that filed diligence claims and
statements of water user's claims, such as HCIC's, have "never been open to the public
and been through that public process." (R.2789, T. 1002:14-15.) In other words, the
public does not even know when or if a diligence claim has been filed with the state
engineer. This is exactly the case here. USF did not have any notice of HCIC's alleged
downstream diversion and was not placed on notice by HCIC's furtive filing of a
diligence claim and water user's claim that were not open to public scrutiny. (Findings
1f26,R.2743.)
USF's extensive, conflicting upstream water use contradicts HCIC's assertions
that USF did not challenge HCIC's alleged seniority between 1970 and 1992. USF did
not wait two full decades before objecting to HCIC's claim to a senior right; USF and its
predecessors had been objecting since 1882 by their extensive upstream water use.
Moreover, the upstream water use was a direct sign of protest and resistance to HCIC's
alleged senior claim. Until 1989, USF took its water first, without interference, and had
no reason to worry about anyone diverting downstream, including HCIC. The
interference with USF's upstream water use lasted only a short period and caused USF to
commence this action. (Findings % 26, R.2743.)

G.

USF IS NOT BARRED BY THE 1984 PROPOSED
DETERMINATION

USF is not barred by the San Rafael Proposed Determination. The trial court
correctly ruled that USF filed an objection to the San Rafael Proposed Determination and
that USF's claims are not barred. (Findings % 27, R.2742; Conclusions % 19, R.2751.) A
notice deadline requires only substantial compliance if the statute imposes no penalty for
failure to comply. See Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480,481-83 (Utah 1980)
(notice filed over two months late substantially complied with statute); In re General
Determination ofPayette River Drainage, 687 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Idaho 1984) (court has
discretion to hear objections to proposed determination filed after 60 day deadline);
accord Felida Neighborhood Ass 'n v. Clark County, 913 P.2d 823, 826 (Wash. Ct. App.
1996) ("Failure to satisfy the notice requirements of a statute is excused where substantial
compliance resulted in full and adequate notice."), cert denied, 922 P.2d 98 (Wash.
1996).
USF substantially complied with Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 by filing its objection
to the San Rafael Proposed Determination one day after the 90 day deadline.18 The
language of section 73-4-11 imposes no penalty for failure to timely file an objection.
Moreover, section 73-4-11 provides that any claimant "dissatisfied" with the proposed
determination "may" file a written objection. This is not mandatory language. Further,
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-10 allows a court to extend the time for filing any pleading or
protest for "due cause shown." As it turned out, USF did not need to request an
extension because the court accepted its 1984 objection and 1989 objection, and no one,
18

USF appears to have filed one day late because it did not count an extra day in
February for leap year. The Court should reject HCIC's argument that USF filed its
objection with the court on the 95th day. HCIC neglected to read the Certificate of
Mailing verifying that the objection was mailed to the court on March 2, 1984. (Ex. 48B
at 3.) Thefilingwas effective upon mailing pursuant to Utah R.Civ. P. 5(b)(2) (1977)
then in effect.
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including HCIC, moved to strike these pleadings. For these reasons, under Stahl, USF
needed only to comply substantially with section 73-4-11, which it did.
This Court's decision in Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287 (Utah 1992) does not
apply here. In Jensen there was no independent action for monetary damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief as there is here.19 Moreover, in Jensen, an objection was
filed more than tliree years too late. USF's objection was filed one day late and has never
been challenged by a motion to strike or otherwise.
1.

USF Sufficiently Objected to HCIC's "Junior" Water Right

The trial court found that USF generally objected to the state engineer's listing of
all rights of "junior appropriators" adverse to the "senior rights" of USF. (Findings f 27,
R.2742; Ex. 48B, f 5.) The trial court further found that HCIC was a junior appropriator
based on the evidence of beneficial use. (Findings ff 15-23, R.2738-41.) This Court
should give the trial court'sfindingsdeference because HCIC has not marshaled evidence
to challenge the findings. See In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)
(declaring "appellants should recognize that the burden of overturning factual findings is
a heavy one, reflective of the fact that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed
facts"). Accordingly, USF's objection was written broadly enough to include Water
Right No. 93-1134 of HCIC for which the state engineer had recommended a senior 1885
priority date.
Under all the facts and circumstances involved in this case, USF had every reason
to believe that it had the senior rights to Cedar Creek. (Findings f 26, R.2742.) USF was
first in line to take its water upstream above any other water user. Cedar Creek was
diverted upstream above HCIC since 1882. As such, USF was justified in generally
19

Filing an objection to the San Rafael Proposed Determination was unnecessary for
USF to maintain this action against HCIC for monetary damages and declaratory and
injunctive relief. See Spanish Fork West Field Irr. Co. v. District Court, 110 P.2d 344,
346 (Utah 1941); Smith v. District Court, 256 P. 539, 542-543 (Utah 1927).

objecting to the listing of any other "junior" right as more senior than USF's rights. Id.
More important here, HCIC already was on notice of USF's upstream water use which
since 1882 had taken water that would have satisfied HCIC's alleged senior right to the
first 10.0 cfs from Cedar Creek. HCIC did not need further notice of USF's claim to
prior rights. HCIC was not relying on any upstream silence—there was extensive
upstream water use, not silence.
After HCIC finally ended generations of silence by demanding in 1989 (Exs. 127
and 128) that USF release to HCIC the first 10.0 cfs in Cedar Creek, USF specifically
objected to the listing of Water Right No. 93-1134 on Page 215 of the San Rafael
Proposed Determination. (Findingsfflf26, 27, R.2742; Ex. 48C.) HCIC never moved to
strike either USF's 1984 or 1989 objections. (Exs. 48B, 48C.) Both objections are still
pending. These objections simply document what was happening within Cedar Creek
since 1882—HCIC was losing water to an upstream user and did nothing to protect its
asserted senior right downstream.
2.

HCIC Waived Its Claim that USF is Barred by the Proposed
Determination

In a hearing conducted by telephone three days before trial, HCIC ambushed USF.
HCIC asserted that USF was barred by not objecting timely or otherwise to the listing of
Water Right No. 93-1134 in the San Rafael Proposed Determination. (Findings \ 7,
R.2730.) HCIC explained in its opening brief that "mere silence is not a waiver unless
there is some duty or obligation to speak." Brinton v. IHCHosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956,
965 (Utah 1998). (Findings f 9, R.2730.) As already established above, HCIC did have
a duty to speak against USF's upstream water use for decades, not three days prior to or
the first day of trial. By contrast, HCIC suffered absolutely no undue hardship or
prejudice from USF's objection being one day late. HCIC already was on actual notice
of USF's upstream water use and diversions of Cedar Creek that deprived HCIC of water

to satisfy its alleged senior downstream water right. For this same reason, HCIC was not
prejudiced by USF's failure, if any, to specifically protest the listing of Water Right No.
93-1134 in the San Rafael Proposed Determination.
In delaying until three days before trial-115 years after the first upstream
diversion and use of water, thirteen years after USF's original objection (Ex. 48B) and six
years after USF's specific objection (Ex. 48Q--HCIC is barred from asserting that USF
failed to timely or otherwise object to Water Right No. 93-1134 listed in the San Rafael
Proposed Determination. (Conclusions ^ 9, R.2749.)
3.

No Public Policies were Violated in Resolving this Water Dispute

The Court should reject HCIC's public policy argument. Neither the general
water rights adjudication statutes in Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-11 to -15 (1989) nor the
"mini" adjudication statute in Section 73-4-24 precluded the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over USF's claims against HCIC for declaratory and injunctive relief and
monetary damages. (Findings flf 5, 6, R.2736; Conclusionsfflj2, 3, R.2747.) This Court
has recognized that the general adjudication process in Sections 73-4-11 to -15 is not the
exclusive procedure for water users to assert their claims. Murdoch v. Springville
Municipal Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994) (district courts have discretion to hear
petitions for "mini" adjudication of water rights under Section 73-4-24 outside general
adjudications); see also, Spanish Fork West Field Irr. Co. v. District Court, 110 P.2d 344,
346 (Utah 1941) (independent claims for monetary damages and other relief not available
in general adjudications may proceed in district court outside such adjudications); Smith
v. District Court, 256 P. 539, 542-43 (Utah 1927) (same). Further, these cases confirm
that filing an objection to a proposed determination is not required to maintain an
independent action for monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief outside
either a general adjudication or "mini" adjudication.

Ruling for USF here will not invite every litigant in a general adjudication who
misses the statutory deadline to file a separate action. Such litigants would have to
demonstrate: (i) they acted for over a century as the senior right holder upstreamfromall
other downstream users; (ii) they filed an objection one day late and then supplemented
the objection, but no one ever moved to strike these objections; and (iii) their opponent
waited to raise the issue until the eve of trial after being on notice for 115 years of the
conflicting, extensive upstream water use.
Finally, nothing prevented the state engineer from intervening in the present
action. The state engineer was not deprived of the opportunity to be heard in this case as
HCIC asserts. The state engineer allowed Regional State Engineer Mark Page to testify
in the case. The public interest of opening the courthouse doors for monetary and
injunctive relief outside of general water adjudications outweighs the interests precluding
such relief.
H.

HCIC--NOT USF--IS BARRED BY LACHES

The doctrine of laches under Great Western Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Farmers
Reservoir & Irr. Co., 124 P.2d 753, 754 (Colo. 1942), cited by HCIC, applies against
HCIC, not USF. (Findings 1f 24, R.2741.) USF is not guilty of laches in this case. USF,
not HCIC, has been in peaceful possession of Cedar Creek water upstreamfromHCIC.
USF did not injure HCIC by any delay in asserting its priority to Cedar Creek water.
Since 1882 USF and its predecessors manifested their senior right to divert the water in
Cedar Creek upstream before any other water user, including HCIC. All downstream
users, including HCIC, were on notice that the water was being diverted upstream and
used on the Ranch, the town of Mohrland and later in the town of Hiawatha. There was
no secret about it. USF's upstream water use was documented and advertised in
accordance with applicable water law since 1876 in the Emery County Recorder's office,
Castle Valley News, and Emery County Progress, placing all users on notice.
ii

II.

USF HAS NOT FORFEITED ANY OF ITS WATER RIGHTS
HCIC did not sustain its burden of proving that USF forfeited water rights in

Cedar Creek prior to December 1, 1982 when the state engineer published the San Rafael
Proposed Determination. (Findingsffif28-39, R.2743-46.) SeeDaltonv. Wadley, 355
P.2d 69, 72 (Utah 1960) (water rights that could not be used without violating state
engineer's proposed determination cannot be forfeited); Glenwoodlrr. Co. v. Myers, 465
P.2d 1013, 1014 (Utah 1970) (same).
A.

USF BENEFICIALLY USED ALL AVAILABLE WATER FROM
CEDAR CREEK

In discussing the law of forfeiture, HCIC neglected to inform the Court of the
most important principle for this case. This Court unequivocally established that there
can be no forfeiture where a water source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy a water
right, and all available water is placed to beneficial use. See Rocky Fordlrr. Co. v. Kents
Lake Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108, 111-113 (Utah 1943). In Rocky Ford, there was
uncontroverted evidence that 'there seldom was sufficient water available"fromthe
water source for an irrigation company to use beneficially all of the water that it had a
right to use under its water rights. 135 P.2d at 111-112. For this reason, this Court
rejected the plaintiffs' forfeiture claim because they could not prove a continuous five
year period during which the defendants "failed to use available water." Id. at 112.
Reasonable cause for nonuse also includes droughts, floods, financial crisis, industrial
depression, operation of legal proceedings or any other unavoidable cause. See Utah
Code Ann. §73-1-4 (1989).20

To avoid forfeiture, available water must be used in only one year in every fiveyear period. See Rocky Ford, 135 P.2d at 112-13. In addition to the foregoing, the filing
of a nonuse application, prior to the expiration of the five year period, tolls the running of
the nonuse statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1989).

As in Rocky Ford, USF has not forfeited water rights because HCIC failed to
prove that for a period of five continuous years, USF did not place all available water to
beneficial use. The evidence shows that there was not available water to irrigate all the
acreage on the Ranch. (Findings f 25, R.2741). HCIC did not marshal critical evidence
that explains why irrigation was limited. Instead HCIC focused exclusively on testimony
concerning the number of acres irrigated on the Ranch over the years. The weight of the
evidence and testimony from witnesses of both sides is uncontroverted that the quantity
of water available in Cedar Creek has not been sufficient to annually irrigate more acres
of land on the Ranch.21 USF and its predecessors used all of the available water from
Cedar Creek for irrigating the Ranch and had ditches and furrows in place ready to
irrigate other lands on the Ranch had sufficient water been available.22 This lack of
Lamond Gardner, HCIC's witness, testified, "There wasn't sufficient water to
irrigate 229 acres" on the Ranch. (R.2790, T. 1297:18-20.) USF's witness, JohnNielson,
testified that he irrigated "around 50, 60 acres, depending on the supply of water. We
used what water we had." (R.2785, T.86:20-23.) When asked why he did not irrigate
more acres, he stated, 'We used all the water there was." (R.2785, T. 125:12.) USF's
witness, Jimmy Allred, testified that he did not irrigate more acres on the Ranch because
he "didn't have enough - any more water" and that he "would have irrigated more land"
if he had more water. (R.2786, T.479:11-13.) USF's witness, Larry Pierce, testified that
he would have tried to irrigate more land "if we had the water
We would irrigate
everything that we could when the water was there," and there were fields and ditches in
place to divert water if he had enough water. (R.2787, T.581:24-582:1.) Mr. Pierce
estimated that the average flow of Cedar Creek in the spring was "a foot to two and a half
foot," and in the summer was "maybe a half a foot to none." (R.2787, T.585:13-20.) Mr.
Pierce also testified that he could not grow crops on the Ranch because "I run [sic] out of
water in the summertime." (R.2787, T.594:14-15.) USF's witness, Robert Gitlin,
testified that "we had a lot offieldsto irrigate if the water was available, but there was
never water available." (R.2787, T.621:18-22.) He also testified that the lessees were
always asking for '"what water was available." (R.2788, T.814:16-19.) He also testified
that the average annual flow that went through the pipe to Hiawatha from the Mohrland
Portal was 1.8 cfs. (R.2788, T.813:19.)
22
USF's witness, John Nielson, testified that before the pipeline went in he received
enough waste water in some yearsfromthe Ranch to irrigate his 40 acre parcel on his
farm below the Ranch. He testified that after the pipeline went in "[t]here wasn't any.
They took all the water normally that I used for my little ranch. When they put the
1A

available water prevented forfeiture. Further, the drought years in the 1950's, 1977 and
1987 cannot be counted toward a forfeiture. These events were physical causes beyond
the control of USFfromwhich no forfeiture can result. See Rocky Ford, 135 P.2d at 111113; Utah Code Ann. 73-1-4 (1989).
In addition, the flow of Cedar Creek averages less than 2.0 cfs during the early
irrigation season and dwindled to less than 1.0 cfs in late summer. (Findings f 25, R.
2741; R.2785, T. 145:1-4; R.2789; R.2790, T. 1239:12-22.) The meager flow proves that
there was not sufficient water available to irrigate more acreage on the Ranch. The
historical flow is only a smallfractionof the 5.246 cfs that USF has a right to use for
irrigating the Ranch. The limited water flow in Cedar Creek explains why only a
fraction of the 229 acres could have been irrigated on the Ranch. (R.2792, T. 1839:101840:8.) There simply has not been enough water to irrigate more acres. This fact
prevents any forfeiture of USF's right to irrigate up to 135.66 acres on the Ranch as
properly found by the trial court. (Conclusions f 13, R.2750; Order % 3, R.2758.)
B.

USF COULD NOT PARTIALLY FORFEIT WATER RIGHTS
UNDER EXISTING LAW

This Court should not impose the harsh penalty of partial forfeiture without clear
precedent or statutory authority. The Court should reject HCIC's assertions that USF has
partially forfeited its water rights for irrigating more than 30 to 50 acres on the Ranch and
watering livestock in the winter. These assertions are contrary to the trial court findings.
(Findingsfflf30, 39, R.2743, 2746.) This Court has never decided whether a partial
forfeiture of a water right can occur, even though some justices have addressed the
possibility. (Findings f 28, R.2743); Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 775 n.9
(Utah 1991); Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108, 112 (Utah
pipeline in, there was not enough waste water come [sic] off to do any good." (R.2785,
T.141:14-17.) But before the pipeline went in there was enough waste water for Mr.
Nielson to use in only "some years." (R.2785, T. 128:1.)

1943). In Eskelsen, the trial court concluded that partial forfeiture does not apply in
Utah. 819P.2dat775n.9. The Court properly left the matter to the Legislature.23
C

HCIC DID NOT MARSHAL ALL THE EVIDENCE OF IRRIGATED
ACRES

HCIC, as the appellant, has failed to carry its heavy burden of marshaling all the
evidence that supports the trial court's findings of fact regarding irrigation of the Ranch.
(Findingsffij17, 18, 21, 23, 30, R.2739, 2741,2743; Conclusionsffl[5-7, 13, R.2748;
Orderfflf3, 4, R.2758.) HCIC "must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly
erroneous.'" In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). As the Utah Court
of Appeals explained in discussing this Court's decisions on marshalling,
[t]o successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact,
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. Attorneys
must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly
discharge the marshaling duty the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings
the appellant resists.
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotations omitted).
In attempting to marshal the evidence of beneficial use on the Ranch, HCIC fell
significantly short of marshaling "every scrap" of evidence which it resists. HCIC did
not provide the Court with the extensive evidence contained in the state engineer's files
23

House Bill 58 recently enacted this year by the Utah Legislature recognizes partial
forfeiture of water rights but does not apply retroactively to the present case that was
commenced in 1992. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (stating a statute is only retroactive if
"expressly so declared"). See also Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v.
Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1995) (same).

submitted over many years, without protest by HCIC, to support USF's upstream water
use. (Findings ^ 30, R.2743-44.) The following chart summarizes the evidence that
HCIC overlooked and on which the trial court relied in making its findings of fact:

D.

Date

Number of Acres
Irrigated on Ranch

Exhibit

June 4,1907

149.93

27B

July 10, 1910

149.93

27D

August 1, 1912

149.93

27C

November 12, 1912

149.93

27E

February 26, 1936

150 acres (incidental use)

29

October 11, 1957

135.66

27G

July, 1960

135.66

32C

October, 1960

135.66

27H

April 6,1962

135.66

271

May 28, 1962

135.66

32B

June 4, 1962

135.66

32D

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DON BARNETFS
TESTIMONY

The trial court properly exercised its considerable discretion in allowing Mr.
Barnett's testimony. This Court has made clear that a trial court's decision to allow
rebuttal testimony and expert testimony will not be overturned, unless there is a "clear
showing of abuse." See Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974); Adams v.
Lang, 275 P.2d 881, 883 (Utah 1954); Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, If 19. Proper
rebuttal evidence is "evidence tending to refute, modify, explain or otherwise minimize
or nullify the effect of the opponent's evidence." Green \ 23.

At trial, the court correctly allowed Mr. Barnett to provide rebuttal testimony
refuting the opinion testimony of HCIC's witnesses on the number of acres irrigated on
the Ranch. (R.2792, T. 1808:13-17.) Mr. Barnett's testimony was proper and expressly
rebutted HCIC's evidence of irrigated acres. In particular, Mr. Barnett refuted the several
HCIC witness opinions on the number of acres irrigated at the Ranch based upon, in
many cases, windshield observations made by these witnesses over the years. (R.2790,
T. 1249:8-12; 1254:1-10; 1256:15; 1257:5; 1323:7; 13224:34; 1339:4-9; 1356:1-4;
R.2791, T.1682:15-1683:20; T.1703:8-1704:9; T.1710:18-1711:4.) The trial court's
admission of Mr. Bamett's rebuttal evidence cannot be classified as an abuse of
discretion on the grounds that the testimony convincingly refuted HCIC's evidence.
Moreover, the cases cited by HCIC do not support its claim that the trial court
abused its discretion. For instance, in Arnold v. Curtis, this Court upheld a trial court's
exercise of discretion to exclude evidence offered in violation of a scheduling order. 846
P.2d 1307, 1309 (Utah 1993). Arnold is clearly distinguishable here because Arnold does
not stand for the proposition that courts must exclude testimony if offered after a
deadline in a court's scheduling order but that courts have discretion to "make such
orders." Id. (citing Utah R.Civ.P. 16(d)). In this case, the trial court exercised its
discretion and chose not to exclude Mr. Bamett's testimony. The court's decision was
proper, especially given that HCIC has failed to argue or present evidence demonstrating
that the designation of Mr. Bamett as a witness prejudiced HCIC in any way.
Similarly, Turner and Roundy do not apply here because both cases involved
situations where parties sought to introduce previously unidentified witnesses at trial.
See Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Utah 1994) (upholding trial court's refusal to
allow rebuttal witness not identified prior to trial); Roundy v. Staley, 1999 UT App 229,
fflf 13 - 15 (reversing trial court's allowance of rebuttal witness improperly not identified

i«

prior to trial). In this case, USF identified Mr. Barnett prior to trial and over a month
before the deadline for depositions. (R.984-88, 1031-32).
HCIC's allegation that the trial court abused its discretion rings hollow
considering HCIC has not alleged that it was prejudiced or surprised24 by Mr. Barnett's
testimony. Simply, HCIC has failed to demonstrate any abuse by the trial court
especially where the trial court's decision comports with the general rule that 'testimony
presented for the purpose of rebuttal should be admitted, even if the rebuttal is somewhat
repetitive of testimony on issues addressed during the case-in-chief." Green f 23. As
this Court has explained, a trial court's decision to allow rebuttal evidence will not be
overturned absent abuse. Moreover, HCIC's concentration on what was presented in the
case-in-chief is misplaced given the fact that rebuttal may cover issues already presented
in the case-in-chief. See id.
Distilled to its essence, HCIC's complaint with Mr. Barnett's testimony is that
HCIC does not agree with the conclusion the testimony compels. Instead of seeking to
exclude the testimony after the trial court has admitted the evidence, HCIC should have
presented its own rebuttal evidence. HCIC's disagreement with Mr. Barnett's testimony
is an insufficient basis for alleging that the trial court abused its discretion. The trial
court's admission of Mr. Barnett's testimony should be affirmed.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF 135.66 IRRIGATED ACRES
ON THE RANCH WAS PROPER

The trial court weighed the evidence of beneficial use and found that the weight of
the evidence supported a finding of 135.66 acres irrigated on the Ranch. (Findingsffif17,
18, 21, 23, 30, R.2739, 2741,2743; Conclusionsffif5, 6, 7, 13, R.2748, 50; Orderfflf3,4,
24

HCIC cannot claim surprise because USF identified Mr. Barnett as an expert
witness on December 13, 1996 and filed his report three days later. (R.984-88.)
Moreover, HCIC had until January 21, 1997 to depose Mr. Barnett but chose not to avail
itself of this discovery tool. (R. 1031.)

R.2758.) The trial court never mentioned that it relied upon Mr. Barnett's testimony in
reaching this conclusion. Id. Rather, the Court relied, in part, upon Certificate No. a406
for change Application No. a3317 issued by the state engineer. (Findings \ 30, R.274344.) The trial court obviously questioned the credibility of the lay witness testimony and
instead relied upon engineering and surveyed proofs confirming the extent of irrigation
on the Ranch. This Court should not second-guess the trial court's assessment of all of
the evidence of beneficial use, especially because HCIC has not properly marshaled the
evidence.
Of the time periods of use listed by HCIC, only the 1940s, 1950s, 1962-68, and
the 1970s are relevant here. The Utah Supreme Court held in In re Escalante Valley
Drainage Area, 363 P.2d 777 (Utah 1961), that water users "should be neither expected
nor required to use their water contrary to the state engineer's proposed determination in
order to protect their rights." Id. at 778. More directly, <cthe filing of the state engineer's
proposed determination . . . interrupted the running of the nonuse statute against the
plaintiffs." Id. The court correctly held that the plaintiffs did not forfeit their water
rights. Id.
In this case, the filing of the San Rafael Proposed Determination in December
1982 interrupted the running of the nonuse statute against USF and it was not required to
use water contrary to this determination to avoid forfeiture. Moreover, USF is not trying
to "have its cake and eat it too." USF filed its objections to the San Rafael Proposed
Determination and placed at issue its water rights against those of HCIC. (Findings % 27,
R.2743.)
In addition, the lack of available water, not USF's alleged waste, has determined
the number of acres irrigated on the Ranch.
25

HCIC did not sustain its burden as to the

The Court should ignore HCIC's attempt to limit USF's water right by its
manipulation of the average .9 cfs flow rate into an annual acre foot limit. As Don
An

relevant timeframesby showing that Cedar Creek yielded a sufficient supply of water for
USF to irrigate more land than it did. Further, the weight of the evidence confirms that
between 105 and 140 acres are and were irrigated on the Ranch. (Findings % 30, R.2743;
Conclusions % 13, R.2750; Exs. 27B, 27C, 27D, 27E, 27G, 27H, 271, 29, 32B, 32C, 32D,
R.2792,T. 1810:22-24.)
F.

USF DID NOT PARTIALLY FORFEIT ITS STOCKWATERING
WATER RIGHT NO. 93-267

The trial court specifically found no forfeiture of USF's stockwatering rights.
(Findings % 39, R.2746.) The Court should reject HCIC's assertion that USF forfeited its
right to water livestock in the wintertime under Water Right No. 93-267. HCIC's expert
witness and former state engineer, Dee Hansen, testified that stockwatering has no
seasonable limit and is a year-round use. (R.2791, T. 1637:20-1638:7.) Moreover,
stockwatering is considered an incidental use to irrigation—if the cattle are near water
and they are thirsty, they will drink the water. (R.2791, T. 1728:21-1729:6.) HCIC's
argument admits that USF stockwatered during the Spring, Summer and Fall during the
period they identify. (HCIC Brief at 44-45.) This use is sufficient to preserve USF's
stockwatering rights against reduction under Rocky Ford. HCIC failed to prove that the
quantity of water used by the livestock on the Ranch during the Spring, Summer, and Fall
each year did not consume all of the water that USF had a right to beneficially use each
year for stockwatering. The trial court correctly concluded that HCIC failed to prove 5
consecutive years of nonuse throughout each season of each year. (Findings f 39,
R.2746.)

Barnett explained, to calculate an annual volume in acre feet from an average daily
diversion rate, or vis-a-versa, is misleading because the Court must falsely assume that
Cedar Creekflowsat that constant rate year round. (R.2792, T.1821:14-1823:19). The
evidence confirmed that Cedar Creekflowswere not constant butfluctuatedwidely from
10.0 cfs in the early spring to less than .10 cfs in late summer. See Findings *U 25.

G.

USF DID NOT FORFEIT ITS RIGHTS BY EXCESSIVE WASTE OF
WATER

The trial court correctly rejected HCIC's assertion that USF's failure to line its
ditch with concrete or otherwise prevent seepage constitutes waste. (Conclusions f 11,
R.2749.) HCIC presented no evidencefromwhich the trial court could find that USF
violated any customary and accepted irrigation practices in the area for similar soil types.
Id.
HCIC cites to no authority that seepage from a diversion ditch results in forfeiture
of a water right. Wayman v. Murray City Corporation, 458 P.2d 861 (Utah 1969), is
inapposite because that case does not address forfeiture or waste, but allocation of
underground water among competing wells xmder a "rule of reasonableness" that does not
apply to surface streams. Id. at 865. Further, Brian v. Fremont Irrigation Co., 186 P.2d
588 (Utah 1947), does not apply here because it too has nothing to do with forfeiture or
waste; it involved injury to crops caused by overflow of surplus water from upstream
diversions.
Moreover, the treatise cited by HCIC recognizes that '"there is bound to be some
loss of the water in transit between the point of diversion and the place of use." Clesson
S. Kinney, Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights § 907, at 1601 (2d ed. 1912). Further,
water evaporates and seeps through ditches, but this does not "constitute . . . the wasting
of water." Id.
HCIC has not established that USF's use of water on the Ranch was unreasonable
in light of the customary irrigation practices in the area and on similar soil types.
(Conclusions f 11, R.2749.) There is absolutely no evidence that water users in areas
with similar soil conditions customarily line ditches to prevent seepage or that this could
be done by reasonable effort and expense. As Robert Eccli confirmed, USF considered
lining the ditch but made the business decision not to do so. (R.2790, T. 1395:25-

1397:21.) Moreover, the use of unlined ditches is customary in this area, as evidenced by
John Nielson's diversion ditches located below the Ranch. (R.2785, T.89:10-24.) In
fact, flood irrigation systems and unlined diversion ditches, as used on the Ranch, are
customary and accepted by the state engineer-despite being 50 percent efficient.
(R.2789, T.993:16-20, M. Page; Ex. 48A, San Rafael Proposed Determination, f 8, at iiiiv.)
USF's diversion and irrigation system is much more efficient than the accepted
method in Emery County. Larry Pierce testified that in the Spring and Fall seepage from
USF's diversion ditch was only about 10 percent, and in the summer there was "no
water" in Cedar Creek ccto divert anyway," so the amount of seepage in the diversion
ditch did not matter. (R.2787, T.595:3-20).26 Moreover, Jimmy Allred testified that the
seepage was only about "one-third or less" but it varied "from July and August."
(R.2786, T.470:5-20.) Mr. Pierce tried to grow crops on the Ranch, but he could not
because he ran "out of water in the summertime." (R.2787, T.594:14-15.) Lack of water
in Cedar Creek in the summer led to watering primarily pasture grasses on the Ranch
(R.2787, T.581:11-18), which is a recognized beneficial use. See In re Escalante Valley
Drainage Area, 355 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1960); (R.2790, T.1285:7-ll, L. Gardner).
HCIC's claims of extraordinary waste of water by USF are unfounded. HCIC has
not marshaled the evidence to question the trial court's findings that USF did not waste
water. (Findings ff 17, 18, 21, 24, 25, 30, R.2739, 2740, 2741, 2743; Conclusions f 11,
R.2749); Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (holding that "[i]f the
appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record
26

Robert Eccli never testified that there was 45 percent seepage; rather, he testified
that he never measured the seepage in USF's ditch. (R.2790, T. 1396:18-22.) Moreover,
thefigurereferenced in Exhibit 36 was derived from measurements taken over just a 16
day period in 1961 and is not representative of seepage in the ditch each year from 1882
to 1992.

supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the
lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case"). HCIC
exaggerates the testimony of Robert Gitlin. Mr. Gitlin did nol testify that water was used
on the same place day after day on the Ranch. Gitlin testified that he did not intentionally
make a practice of letting the water run on the land and then turning it back to Cedar
Creek. (R.2787, T.621:18-22, 626:5-11). After Gitlin testified to this effect, counsel for
HCIC pressed: "So if witnesses come and say that they saw for weeks on end the water
running through the same location on the ranch and then going back to the creek, they'd
be mistaken?" Gitlin responded: "Not necessarily. We could have missed it." (R.2787,
T.628:5-10). Gitlin's honest admission that within a ten-year span of operations on the
Ranch, there may have been a missed rotation, does not evidence excessive waste of
water. To the contrary, Gitlin testified that there was no waste of water on the Ranch.
See id
HCIC also overstates that the testimony of Kay Jensen and Lamond Gardner
established that USF wasted water. The repetitious testimony of HCIC s witnesses
appeared to be coached to "toe the party line" as to irrigation practices on the Ranch.
Their "canned" testimony lacked credibility, something that the trial court obviously
recognized and another reason for not second-guessing on appeal. Jensen testified that he
was "pretty familiar" with the Ranch; however, he never worked on the Ranch, and his
observations of the Ranch are at best isolated incidents, not daily observations necessary
to prove excessive waste. (R.2789, T. 1104:15-21, 1116:3-1118:7). HCIC also
exaggerates Mr. Gardner's testimony. Gardner rarely, if ever, went on the Ranch in the
1950's and 1960's. (R.2790, T. 1282:1-1283:14). Gardner did not make daily
observations to allow him to credibly testify that water continuously ran to waste on the
Ranch. Like Jensen, Gardner's observations at best were isolated, sporadic incidents, and
do not establish systematic waste of water on the Ranch.
44

USF's use of a diversion ditch and any seepage associated therewith was not
shown by HCIC to be unreasonable in light of the customary and accepted irrigation
practices in the area and on similar soil types. (Conclusions f 11.) USF's use of its
diversion ditch did not constitute excessive waste of water and did not result in any
forfeiture of water rights. Id. Water that seeped from USF's ditch would have been
available for HCIC and other downstream water users. There is insufficient evidence to
conclude that seepage from USF's unlined ditch is not customary in the area and is not a
reasonably efficient method of irrigation or that water from Cedar Creek was allowed to
run to waste on the Ranch. In fact, using unlined ditches is customary and accepted in
the San Rafael Drainage Area. (R.2789, T.993:16-20; Ex. 48A, San Rafael Proposed
Determination, f 8, at iii-iv.) Finally, HCIC's assertions of water running onto the Ranch
in the wintertime could not result in any forfeiture of irrigation rights because there exists
no right to divert in the wintertime for irrigation purposes.
H.

WATER RIGHT NO, 93-3524 HAS NOT BEEN FORFEITED

USF has not forfeited the borehole Water Right No. 93-3524 allowing it to divert
.37 cfs from Cedar Creek for use in Hiawatha. This Court has ruled that HCIC has not
sustained its burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence that available water under
this right was not beneficially used for a continuous five-year period. (Findings 1ft[ 35,
36, R.2745; Conclusionsffif15, 16, R.2750.)
1.

The State Engineer's Nonuse Extensions Prevented Forfeiture of
Water Right No, 93-3524

The state engineer granted extensions to resume use covering nearly a 50 year
period, including the period from 1964 to 1972 disputed by HCIC. (Exs. 50B-J.) By
statute, the nonuse extensions granted by the state engineer prevented Water Right No.
3524frombeing forfeited. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1989). Extension No. 151
filed in 1963 granted USF until 1968 to resume water use. (Ex. 50F.) Extension No. 218

filed in 1968 granted USF until 1973 to resume water use. (Ex. 50E.) In 1972, USF
resumed use of the .37 cfs in Hiawatha after its pipeline was completed. Both of the
extensions covered Change Certificate a268 for .37 cfs under Water Right No. 93-3524.
(Ex. 3 ID). HCIC had many opportunities to protest, participate and appeal each of the
extensions but instead sat idle until asserting forfeiture too late in this action.
(Conclusions f 16, R.2750.) These extensions shield USF from HCIC's dilatory
forfeiture claims.
2.

HCIC is Barred from Asserting Water Right JNo, 93-3524 is
Forfeited

In addition, HCIC is barred from asserting that Water Right No. 93-3524 is
forfeited. (Conclusions % 16, R.2750.) As explained above, HCIC had a duty to appeal
the state engineer's decision approving the extension applications and pipeline change
applications and raise all issues, including any alleged forfeiture of water rights in an
appeal to district court. See Glenwood Irr. Co. v. Myers, 465 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Utah
1970) (barring protestant's forfeiture action filed three years after protestant should have
filed appeal of state engineer's approval of nonuse application); Provo City v. Lambert,
545 P.2d 185, 186-187 (Utah 1976) (barring protestantfromfilinglawsuit challenging
water rights 23 years after protestant should have filed appeal of state engineer's
decision); East Bench Irr. Co. v. Utah, 300 P.2d 603, 606-607 (Utah 1956) ("there are
issues in every appeal from the [state engineer's] decision[s] which must be adjudicated"
such as "impairment of vested rights" and "priority of conflicting rights.").
The Court should reject HCIC's assertion that it is not barred by failing to appeal
the state engineer's decision approving the nonuse extensions and pipeline change
applications. HCIC did not protest USF's nonuse applications filed in 1963 and 1968.
HCIC protested (Ex. 33D) the 1972 pipeline change applications, including the change
application (Ex. 35A) for Water Right No. 93-3524. However, the trial court correctly

found that HCIC did not appeal the state engineer's decision and has estopped from
asserting forfeiture by USF. (Conclusionsffif15, 16, R.2750.) HCIC had a duty to
appeal the state engineer's approval of these applications. USF relied on HCIC's silence
and made substantial investments to complete its pipeline and place the .37 cfs to
beneficial use in Hiawatha. Id. HCIC is now barred from asserting that Water Right No.
93-3524 is forfeited. Id
3.

Beneficial Use, Even if Illegal, Prevented Forfeiture

The Court should reject HCIC's arguments that illegal beneficial use leads to
forfeiture of water rights. This Court has established that a beneficial use, albeit illegal,
prevents forfeiture of water rights. See Eskelsen, 819 P.2d at 776. In Eskelsen, a, town
illegally leased its water rights for irrigation. The lease violated a Utah Constitution
provision prohibiting towns from leasing or selling their water rights. The Court affirmed
the trial court's decision that there was no forfeiture because the water had been placed to
beneficial use, albeit illegally. See id.
The Eskelsen decision shreds HCIC's assertions that beneficial use on the Ranch
did not prevent a forfeiture of Water Right No. 93-3524. The beneficial use of the .37 cfs
on the Ranch during the period from 1964 to 1972 protected the water right.
(Conclusions % 16, R.2750.) The 1964 and 1968 water rights summaries, upon which
HCIC relies, state that a change application should be filed to cover the use of the .37 cfs
on the Ranch. (Exs. 158, at 44, 159, at 2.) Because the borehole diversion was upstream
from the Ranch diversion, water that was not diverted into the borehole continued down
Cedar Creek and was diverted and used to irrigate the Ranch. USF's nonuse applications
explained, "While the use under Certificate No. 2195 will be temporarily discontinued,
this water will not be wasted but will be used during the irrigation season on the Ranch."
(Ex. 50I-J, at 2.) The water was placed to beneficial use even if there was no change
application. Moreover, the evidence also confirms that USF placed to use all of the water

available in Cedar Creek. This beneficial use prevented forfeiture of Water Right No. 933524. (Findingsffl|35, 36, R.2745; Conclusions U 14, R.2750.)
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court should be
AFFIRMED.
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